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Arranged marriage : Part II - eBook - costemama.tk
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Marc Abbott. The Marsh Demon. Nelson Evergreen. Cupboard Love. Section 2. In the first second nation, arranged marriages are uncommon common and therefore it is relatively difficult straightforward for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. Next, in this setting, this section explains why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the second nation.
Section 3 concludes and then suggests two ways in which the research in this note might be extended. Consider two individuals 1 and 2 who wish to have an arranged marriage. Each individual i can apply effort to make sure that the desired arranged marriage actually takes place. Note that effort here is a proxy for a variety of possible tasks that include, but are not limited to, the placement of newspaper advertisements and profiles in online matrimonial sites, information gathering and sharing with parents, relatives, and friends, and the hiring of one or more matchmakers.
We suppose that this effort is chosen from the closed set [ 0 , 5 ] 2. Applying effort is costly to individual i and therefore this application gives rise to disutility. The reader may want to think of the effort e i as the number of hours required to either personally engage in or have others undertake one or more of the tasks delineated in the preceding paragraph. The gross utility of each individual depends on both the effort applied by himself or herself and on the effort applied by the other individual. Specifically, if individuals i and j choose efforts e i and e j respectively then the gross utility to individual i is given by.
With this background out of the way, let us now stipulate the net utility function of individual i as a function of his or her effort e i in three separate cases. Note that the net utility function is the difference between the gross utility and the disutility functions specified earlier in this section. Inspecting the three net utility functions for individual i given in Equations 2 through 4 , we can immediately draw two unambiguous conclusions.
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The first order necessary condition for an optimum and the optimal value of e i are. This means that s he solves. Differentiating the maximand in Equation 7 , the first order necessary condition for an optimum and the best response function we seek are given by. Suppose we have two identical pairs of individuals of the sort we have been analyzing thus far in sections 2. These two pairs are located in two different nations.
In this setting, we want to study the application of effort and an implication of this application by these two pairs of individuals who wish to have an arranged marriage. To fix ideas, let us think of Sweden as an example of a country where arranged marriages are uncommon and India as a country where arranged marriages are common. Given this state of affairs, we now want to use our theoretical analysis in sections 2. The discussion in Section 2. So, our analysis shows that it is certainly likely that in arranged marriage unfriendly Sweden, individuals wishing to have an arranged marriage will obtain net utility that is much lower than the net utility obtained by identical individuals in arranged marriage friendly India.
We can think of this result as an example of a situation in which self- fulfilling expectations give rise to two equilibria with high and low net utilities to the two relevant pairs of individuals. In the arranged marriage effort application game that we are analyzing, our analysis thus far shows clearly that the effort application of individual i is increasing in the effort application of individual j.
In game-theoretic language, this means that the effort application choices of the two individuals are strategic complements. This completes our analysis of the arranged marriage effort application game. We shall not repeat our main conclusions from Section 2. Having said this, our principal summary point is that in this note, we analyzed a simple, static game model of the effort applied by two individuals 1 and 2 who wished to have an arranged marriage.
The analysis conducted here can be extended in a variety of ways. Here are two suggestions for possible extensions. First, it would be useful to study a dynamic game model in which the two individuals are interested not only in applying effort to bring an arranged marriage to fruition but also in applying effort to ensure that the arranged marriage does not end in divorce at some future date. Second, following the work of Greenberg et al. Studies that examine these aspects of the problem will shed valuable light on the functioning of arranged marriages.
We thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. In addition, Batabyal acknowledges financial support from the Gosnell endowment at RIT and he thanks Cassandra Shellman for her assistance in formatting the paper. Then finally Pattinson and Mondragon gathered again in the conference room. She scoff and then wanted to laugh. It took a few minutes for those words to sink in, and when she finally understood what her grandfather had said, she felt a wave of anger and denial come over her.
She look at Zachary staring at him blankly, then at her grandfather. She wanted to break everything in rage. But she couldn't. Her hand shook and she clenched her fist and kept staring at her grandfather. Everyone was quiet and she didn't say a thing. Just kept staring. No one knew what she was thinking. Her grandfather thought that she'll refuted for a while but it was now so quiet.
Arranged Marriage! (Part 2)
Aaron look at her clench hands and he knew that something was off. Even James could predict that something bad was going to happen. Andy was as stubborn as her grandfather.